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ENTRENCHING INTERESTS:
STATE SUPERMAJORITY REQUIREMENTS TO RAISE TAXES
by
Max Minzner*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said that... in particular cases, if not in all, more than
a majority of a quorum [ought to have been required] for a
decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a
precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional
shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally
to hasty and partial measures. But these considerations are
outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all
cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to
be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental
principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no
longer the majority that would rule; the power would be transferred
to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular
cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen
themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or in
particular emergencies to extort unreasonable indulgences.'
At the opening of the 104"h Congress, the new Republican majority imposed
the first supermajority requirement "limited to particular cases" in the history of
Congress. House Rule XXI(5)(c) requires the support of 60% of the House for all
increases in federal income tax rates. Democrats immediately criticized
Republicans for ignoring both Madison's warnings and 200 years of history. The
constitutionality of the Rule quickly became the source of litigation.2
The unanswered question is whether the Rule is a good idea, particularly
whether this Rule is well designed. The states have extensive experience with
supermajority requirements for tax increases. Sixteen states have imposed
. Law Clerk, Judge Pamela Rymer, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
J.D., Yale Law School 1999. Sc.B., Brown University 1996. Many thanks to Michael
Graetz, Lior Strahilevitz, and Eric Wolff for their comments and suggestions.
'James Madison, Federalist 58, 396-97 (Cooke Edition).2See Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
supermajority requirements for tax hikes, caps on state revenue, or both.3 When
considered in light of the states' experiences, the Rule appears rather odd. While
eleven states have constitutional provisions and five states have statutory
limitations,4 no state implements its revenue limitations through a procedural rule.
Similarly, while some states have supermajority requirements that apply only to
certain tax types, no state draws it so narrowly as to apply to only income tax rates.5
To the extent the House Republicans believe in federalism, they have failed to look
at the laboratory results.
This article attempts to answer the question of supermajority design. If
alterations in the tax code are to be restricted, how should they be limited?6 To
what type of bills should a supermajority requirement apply? At what level should
the requirement be implemented? When and how should the legislature be allowed
to avoid the rule? Part II discusses the current House rule and considers why it was
imposed, whether or not it is constitutional, and the effect the rule has had in
practice. Part III moves to the states' experiences with supermajority requirements,
and examines both the de jure limitations on legislative behavior and the practical
effects of various forms of supermajority requirements. Finally, Part IV discusses
the primary alternative method that has been used to limit state tax growth: revenue
caps.
Supermajority requirements have essentially one degree of freedom: the
primary design issue is how tightly the legislature should be bound. It is easy to
create supermajority requirements that are too weak to achieve the desired goals.
The House Rule is an excellent example of this. Similarly, it is easy to design
limits that are overly constraining. Finding the dividing line is the essential issue
in supermajority design.
3Part III, infra, examines which states have which types of provisions.4See Table I, at Part III, infra.
5See supra note 4.6Supermajority requirements exist in contexts other than the tax code. The Constitution
mandates a supermajority rule in six situations, see infra notes 18-23 and accompanying
text, and Congress has imposed supermajority rules in other contexts, most notably the
filibuster. As noted above, the House Rule is the first supermajority requirement imposed
upon certain types of substantive legislation. Whether or not one believes supermajorities
should be required for tax increases while a majority of a quorum suffices in non-tax
contexts turns primarily on whether one believes legislatures are more likely to pass
"undesirable" changes to the tax laws than other types of statutes. This article does not
attempt to answer whether the Internal Revenue Code is a particularly good or bad place for
a supermajority requirement, but assumes that one is in place and only tries to look at how
one should be designed.
[Vol. 14
STATE SUPERMAJORITY REQUIREMENTS
II. THE HOUSE RULE
A. Goals: Why Bind Congress?
Legislators attempting to create a good supermajority requirement must
first decide why they want one. The 104 'h Congress never made clear why it
believed a supermajority rule was necessary. The Rule came in as part of the
Contract with America, but did not receive substantial public attention in the weeks
leading up to the 1994 midterm elections.7 Once the Republicans took control, they
implemented several procedural reforms on the first day. House Rule XXI(5)(c)
was one of these. Debate on the Rule was limited, occurring on the same day as
debates over several other reforms proposed by the new Republican majority. The
few references in the debate to the goals behind the Rule were almost exclusively
about limiting the size of government: several Congressmen hoped the
supermajority provision would reduce government receipts.' Similarly, the more
recent discussions of a tax supermajority constitutional amendment9 also indicate
that the primary desired effect of such a requirement was reducing the size of
government, 0 and the press believed that constraining long term spending primarily
motivated the proposed supermajority requirement.' Finally, many of the recent
7In fact, the Congressional leadership immediately backed off their original version of the
supermajority requirement. The Contract with America Provision required a 3/5 vote for all
tax increases. The Republican leadership implemented a Rule that only applied to income
tax rate increases. See Kenneth J. Cooper, House GOP Polishes Plans, Endorses
Committee Leaders, WASH. POST., Dec. 8, 1994 at A8.
'See 141 Cong. Rec. H39-01, H43 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995); id. at H63; id. at H69; id. at H71.
9This amendment was originally proposed as a supplement to the balanced budget
amendment, but did not make it into the final amendment that passed the House.
'See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. H1473-02, H1475 (daily ed. April 15, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Solomon); Testimony of Rep. Joe Barton: Hearing on Tax Limitation Amendment, Federal
Document Clearing House, Mar. 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7135735 (emphasizing the
need for a tax limitation amendment to limit the impact of taxes on American families);
Testimony of J. Kenneth Blackwell, Treasurer of the State of Ohio, Hearing on Tax
Limitation Amendment, Federal Document Clearing House, Mar. 6, 1996, available in 1996
WL 7135737 (arguing for tax limitation amendment to decrease tax burden and increase
growth).
"Eric Pianin, House Passes Balanced Budget Amendment, WASH. POST., Jan. 27, 1995, at
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flat tax proposals contained a supermajority requirement designed to prevent
increases in the size of the federal government12
However, constraining government growth was not the only goal Congress
hoped to achieve. The debates and testimony surrounding the supermajority
amendment and other tax proposals including a supermajority requirement
illuminate a second use of such constraints: A supermajority requirement can
protect a particular tax compromise from future legislative meddling. For instance,
supermajority requirements have been proposed in connection with a national sales
tax as a method to prevent the tax from spiraling upward. 3 House Majority Leader
Richard Armey expressed both uses of the supermajority requirement in his
comments on the supermajority amendment. 14  Supermajority amendments
privilege the existing tax structure and, as discussed infra, while this can be a
serious problem, it is also often an important goal. 5
Turning from what the requirement is supposed to do, the next two sections
discuss what it has done. First, the author considers the debate over the
constitutionality of the House Rule, pointing out that the core constitutional issue
is the same concern that arises in supermajority rule design: How tight should the
requirement be? Then I look at the implementation of the Rule and consider
whether it has, in fact, bound Congress.
12See, e.g., Testimony of Rep. Richard Armey: Hearing on Alternatives to the Federal
Income Tax, Federal Document Clearing House , Apr. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL
10569841 (stating that "the flat tax includes a special safeguard against higher taxes. It
requires a three-fifths supermajority vote of Congress to raise the tax rate, lower the family
allowance or add loopholes.").
3See, e.g., Testimony of Rep. Sonny Bono: Hearing on Tax System, Federal Document
Clearing House, Mar. 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7137953 (supporting supermajority
requirement in conjunction with National Retail Sales Tax to "safeguard" it); Testimony of
J. Kenneth Blackwell, Treasurer of the State of Ohio: Hearing on Fundamental Tax
Changes, Federal Document Clearing House, Mar. 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7137655
(arguing for supermajority requirement to increase public confidence in tax stability and to
prevent balanced budget amendment from leading to tax increases).
14See Eric Pianin, Panel Clears Balanced Budget Measure; Amendment Calls for
Three-Fifths Majority Vote to Raise U.S. Taxes, WASH. POST., Jan. 12, 1995, at A8 (arguing
that "we should balance the budget by cutting the government, not taxing the American
people.").
"See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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B. The Constitutionality Debate: How Tightly Can Congress Be Bound?
The academic debate over the Rule, not surprisingly, has focused on the
constitutionality question: Does the Rules of Proceedings clause 16 allow the House
to redefine the word "passed" as used in the Presentment clause? 1 The text gives
little guidance. The Constitution mandates majoritarianism in three cases:
establishment of a quorum in either house, 18 election of the President in the
electoral college,19 and election of the President by the House in the case where no
candidate gains an absolute majority in the Electoral College. 20 The Constitution
requires supermajority votes in six situations: veto override, treaty ratification,
expulsion of a member, conviction on impeachment, quorum calls in the House
when electing the President, and constitutional amendment. The scholars arguing
for the constitutionality of the Rule point out that if majority voting is generally
required, there is no reason to provide for it in specific cases.21 Those opposed to
the Rule argue that a supermajority is never mandated for "ordinary" legislation,
and also note that the Vice President votes when the Senate is "equally divided., 23
The text provides no definitive way to determine whether this rule mandates
majority rule or simply recognizes it as the likely default choice.24
16U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (stating that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings ... ").
'
7U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (stating that "[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House
of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States ... )
l"U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 5, cl.1.
19 U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 1, cl.3.20 d.
21Chief Judge Edwards tried to counter this claim in his dissent in Skaggs, noting that these
three situations are not covered by standard parliamentary rules. Skaggs, 110 F.3d at 842
(Edwards, C.J., dissenting).22The primary academic opponents of the Rule expressed this argument and others in an
open letter to the House Republicans which was published in 1995. See Bruce Ackerman,
et. al., Comment: An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541
(1995).
23 U.S. CONST. Art. I, §3, cl. 4.
24john 0. Mcginnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative
Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 488 (1995).
1999]
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Lacking an authoritative statement on the constitutionality of the Rule,25
arguments for and against the rule have taken a variety of forms. Resolving this
debate is beyond the scope of this article. For purposes of this article, the essential
point is that the core of the constitutionality argument reflects the same concern as
that shaping the issues designers must consider when drafting a supermajority
requirement. How binding are supermajority requirements and how binding should
they be? How much is gridlock created or the policy preferences of the current
majority entrenched? In addition, whether a majority may waive the rule
determines whether Congressmen have standing to challenge the Rule in court and
whether (and how) the federal courts will enforce the rule. These are all essentially
debates over how tightly the rule binds Congress.
Those challenging the House Rule have focused on the framers' dislike of
supermajority requirements. The Constitution developed, in part, as a response to
gridlock: the inability of the Articles of Confederation to provide a functioning
government. A primary weakness of the Articles were the supermajority
requirements for declaring war, creating treaties, coining money, running a debt,
and appointing a commander in chief.26 The framers rejected both general and
specific supermajority requirements,27 and, in Federalist 58, Madison wrote an
extensive defense of the absence of supermajority voting and quorum rules. The
framers' strong opposition to constitutional supermajority requirements does not
21
necessarily indicate a similar opposition to identical legislative enactments,
although the key concern is still gridlock. Supermajority requirements need to bind
25Supreme Court precedent is even less helpful than the text. Only two Supreme Court cases
have spoken to the issues underlying this constitutional debate. Dicta in INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983), and United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892), imply that a majority is all
that is required to pass legislation. Chadha repeatedly states that legislation becomes law
if passed by a majority of the members of Congress. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948, 958.
However, the Court never indicates whether it is stating a constitutional requirement or
simply recognizing the standard procedure. Similarly, while Ballin notes that the general
rules of parliamentary procedure apply in Congress and the standard rule is that a majority
of a quorum can act for the body, see Ballin, 144 U.S. at 6, it does not indicate whether this
is a default rule which Congress may alter or is mandatory.26These all required the support of nine of the thirteen states.
27Neals-Erik William Delker, The House Three-Fifths Tax Rule: Majority Rule, the
Framers' Intent, and the Judiciary's Role 100 DICK. L. REv. 341, 348-49 (1996).28Legislative enactments are more acceptable because they are less binding. John 0.
Mcginnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995).
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enough to constrain legislative behavior, but not bind so much as to prevent action
when necessary.29
Tax supermajority requirements not only prevent action; they endorse a
particular set of policy decisions. They privilege the existing tax structure.
Depending on the extent to which they can be waived, discussed further infra,
supermajority requirements allow a current majority to lock in the status quo,
inflating their power with respect to future majorities. Some commentators have
focused on this issue in the constitutionality debate. By insisting on an inherent
equality of majorities throughout time, they derive a constitutional prohibition on
supermajority requirements.30 This argument has been extended to support the view
29This gridlock effect is one of the primary criticisms of the filibuster, to which the House
Rule has often been analogized in attempt to defend its constitutionality. Robert S. Leach,
House Rule XXI and an Argument Against a Constitutional Requirement for Majority Rule
in Congress, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1253 (1997). Those arguing against the House Rule
distinguished the filibuster on the grounds that the filibuster is a "procedural" rule while this
rule is "substantive." The authors of the open letter to Congressman Gingrich argue that
supermajority rules are only acceptable when they further "informed and efficient debate and
decision." Ackerman, et. al., supra note 22, at 1541. The examples of rules they believe fall
in this category are the filibuster and the 2/3 vote required to suspend the rules. Id.
However, it would not be hard to argue that raising the bar for tax increases does further
informed debate; Republican Congressmen would likely jump at the chance to defend the
supermajority requirements on the grounds that it makes Congressmen consider seriously
whether to impose greater taxes on the American people. Like all procedural rules, the
filibuster, the practice of Senate holds, the seniority system, and committee assignments
have substantive effects, which is precisely why the debates over controlling them are so
fierce. See Leach, supra, at 1269. To the extent the objections are based on the fact that the
rule is aimed at particular substantive legislation, it is hard to see why that raises
constitutional problems.
30 Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, Note, On Supermajorities and the Constitution, 83
GEO. L.J. 2347, 2356 (1995). Jed Rubenfeld has presented another version of this
usurpation argument. Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46
DuKE L.J. 73 (1996). He provides several examples of rules redefining the word "passed"
that he believes are clearly unconstitutional and yet are not forbidden by the text of the
Constitution. His example rules impose requirements that: I) the ten largest states have veto
power over all legislation; 2) the three largest states do not get their votes counted in any
vote taken; 3) give the Mayor of D.C. veto power over all bills affecting the District; 4)
mandate 90% approval for all bills, which would give California veto power; or 5) require
a 2/3 supermajority in each house, rendering the President's veto power superfluous. Id. at
82-84. From these he derives constitutional principles that: A) each Member gets one equal
vote; B) only the votes of Members count; C) the voting power of small and large states
must be proportionate to population; D) no state can have veto power; and E) the President
1999]
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that even if supermajority rules are constitutional, ones that a majority cannot waive
are not: insulated rules impinge absolutely on the power of future majorities.3'
This issue is also important in the design dispute. The extent to which supermajority
requirements bind the future by entrenching particular views of the current majority
is the key question to be answered when designing them.
Of course, even if a supermajority enactment were unconstitutional, it is not
clear how the question reaches the courts. Few potential plaintiffs would have
standing. The D.C. Circuit rejected the recent challenge to the House Rule in
Skaggs v. Carle32 on standing grounds because the plaintiff voters and Congressmen
failed to show injury in fact.33 The injury alleged was vote dilution. On bills
subject to the House Rule,34 the plaintiff Representatives only had the power to cast
1/261st of the votes necessary for passage, whereas, without the Rule, they would
have had 1/218th. While the court found that vote dilution was a cognizable injury
whether or not it affected a legislative outcome, it insisted on evidence that dilution
actually occurred. 35 The court held that the rule had not led to vote dilution since,
cannot be removed from the process by Congress. Id. at 85. He views a majority voting
requirement as the easiest way to fulfill these constitutional principles. Id. at 84. While this
argument is strong, courts could simply take the approach that rules are acceptable as long
as they do not infringe any of these five principles, which this rule does not. This approach
would allow wide ranging supermajority requirements, as long as they did not do too much.
3 John 0. Mcginnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative
Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE. L.J. 483,503 (1995). These arguments
evaporate under a supermajority amendment because, of course, an amendment is inherently
constitutional. But see Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, Note, On Supermajorities and
the Constitution, 83 GEO. L.J. 2347 (1995) (arguing that an amendment disadvantages an
identifiable group of states, those that receive more government spending than they send to
Washington in tax payments, thus denying them equal suffrage without their consent,
running afoul of the Article V limits on amendments).
32110 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1997).33Injury in fact is one of the three standing requirements outlined in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The other two are causation and redressability. Id.34In fact, the only vote taken that was subject to the rule was on the Mink Amendment,
which obtained only 96 votes, far short of even 50% of the Congress. See Skaggs, 110 F.3d
at 839 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).35Id. at 834-35. Majority avoidance of the rule is discussed further. See infra notes 39-40
and accompanying text.
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in practice, 218 members can still pass legislation.36 The requirements for
amending and repealing a rule are the same as for suspension.
37
Whether or not the D.C. Circuit correctly interpreted the standing
requirement, 8 the court's focus on waiver raises one of the most important issues
in the design of supermajority requirements: enforcement. The standing
requirement itself and its counterpart, the political question doctrine, 39 are focused
36Id. at 835. Amending or repealing a rule only requires a majority of Congress, and while
the Rules Committee must approve changes, 218 Members can force disgorgement from the
committee. Disgorgement requires 218 votes, an absolute majority, not simply a majority
of a quorum. CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRATICE AND PROCEDURE 314-26 (1989).
This limits the ability of a majority of a quorum to pass tax rate increases, but they have
another alternative to pass legislation. They may suspend the rule for a particular bill.
Normally, suspension requires a 2/3 vote, but a simple majority has suspended this 2/3
requirement in the past. Skaggs, 110 F.3d at 835. These suspensions are discussed further
infra. Suspension of the rules requires a single 2/3 vote on the legislation, but House
tradition allows the speaker to ignore a motion to suspend.
17 Alternatively, the House could pass a special rule. Passing a special rule requires two
votes and Rules Committee approval. Once the Rules Committee votes out the bill
establishing the special rule, a majority of the House must approve it. Then a vote must be
taken on the substantive bill itself. As noted above, an absolute majority of the House can
disgorge the bill, but a majority of a quorum cannot. So while 218 members can always get
legislation passed, the Rule may prevent a majority of a quorum from passing a bill it
desires.3
'The court's view of standing is hard to justify both in light of D.C. Circuit precedent and
the realities of Congressional operations. In Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir.
1994), the court found standing on the grounds of vote dilution when the non-voting
delegates from the territories and Puerto Rico were given power to vote in committee of the
whole, despite the fact that if the votes of the delegates were outcome determinative, a new
vote would automatically be taken without their participation. Id. at 625. Under the
Skaggs analysis, this should deny the Michel plaintiffs standing. The Skaggs majority did
not explain the discrepancy. Even if the court intended to overrule Michel, their analysis
ignores the fact that the creation of procedural obstacles of any sort always makes passage
of legislation more difficult. Additional political capital is necessary to obtain suspension
of the rules; additional energy is spent trying to round up votes. In the end, the Rule
certainly makes tax increases harder to pass.
3' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 169 (1962). The Supreme Court has reviewed internal House
procedural rules in the past, see e.g., Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1932);
United States v. Ballin, 4 U.S. 1 (1892), which would weaken any political question claim.
The D.C. Circuit has pioneered another comity doctrine, that of remedial discretion, Riegle
v. Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which might bar a
challenge to the rule. Remedial discretion is similar to the political question doctrine, yet
1999]
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on the question of enforcement. Courts decline to hear cases when they believe
they are not the appropriate branch to decide the question. The issues of which
branch should decide whether a bill is subject to the supermajority mandate, and
whether it actually received the required vote, are extremely important to the design
of the requirements. n°
C. Level of Government: How Tightly is Congress Bound?
Supermajority requirements are more or less binding depending on what
legislation they apply to. Tax supermajority requirements can fail to apply to bills
in two ways. First, the legislation could simply not fall into the requirement's
definition of a "tax bill." Second, the legislation might need a supermajority but the
legislature could waive the requirement. Supermajority requirements are de jure
weaker as their scope narrows and are de facto weaker as the ease of waiver
increases. This section looks at the constraints on Congress, both in law and in fact.
Despite the rhetoric, Congress has so far subjected itself to only the most minimal
limits, with a narrow definition and relatively easy waiver.
it is discretionary, not mandatory. The district court in Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1995), used this mechanism to reject the plaintiffs' claims. D.C. Circuit precedent
is clear, though, that remedial discretion is not an option where there are plaintiffs who are
not members of Congress. See, e.g., Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
In the Skaggs case, as in any well-designed lawsuit, there will also be voters challenging the
rule or statute. The district court used remedial discretion to reject their claims as well,
arguing that they are entirely derivative, sine they are based on exactly the same vote
dilution that the Congressional plaintiffs raised. Skaggs, 898 F. Supp at 3.
4l0he potential for enforcement difficulties in the rule is shown by the controversies that
have arisen over the Byrd rule. Senate legislation is normally subject to filibuster by 41
Senators. In part to avoid filibuster, the Senate implemented fast track proceedings for
budget reconciliation bills, essentially giving these bills immediate cloture. As a
compromise to prevent the introduction of general legislation under this procedure, the
Senate mandates that 60 Senators consent to amendments to reconciliation bills that add
"extraneous material," defined as that which has only a minimal effect on the deficit
compared to its non budgetary provisions. This rule has lead to rancorous debate and
conflicted case by case rulings by the parliamentarian. For background on the Byrd rule and
its interpretative problems, see Donald B. Tobin, Less is More: A Move Toward Sanity in
the Budget Process, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 115, 132-34 (1996).
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1. The De Jure Constraint: What's In and What's Out
There has been significant academic debate on whether the D.C. Circuit
was right in saying that a majority may waive the current rule.4 1 In application,
though, the rule has been frequently subverted. In its three years of existence,
House Rule XXI(5)(c) has only been enforced against one bill. The Mink
Amendment to the 1996 Welfare Reform bill was clearly subject to the provision:
it directly increased the top marginal rate on corporate taxes. As the next section
discusses, the Rule has been waived a number of times, yet most of the situations
have involved bills that were unlikely to have the Rule applied against them in any
event. This is the result of a narrow interpretation of "tax rate increases" by the
House Parliamentarian, the Rules Committee, and the Joint Committee on Taxation,
which have applied the Rule only to those bills which alter the specific sections of
the Code that actually define the applicable rates. The 105th Congress has now
explicitly codified this interpretation. The current Rule only applies to adjustments
of the rate schedules for individuals, 42 corporate rate schedules, 43 or alternative
minimum tax requirements. 44 As will be discussed below, this is far narrower than
almost every state supermajority rule. No state limits their requirement to
adjustment of specific statutory provisions. The approach has the advantage of
constraining any discretionary interpretation of the Rule but sharply weakens the
provision.
2. The De Facto Constraint: Ease of Waiver
Waiver of the House Rule has occurred frequently and easily. Admittedly,
in most of the cases where waiver has occurred, it has not been an attempt to avoid
the rule. Rather, waiver usually happens in circumstances where the Democrats
attempted to find reasons to apply the Rule to block legislation. Two of the 1995
waivers exhibit the standard language Congress uses when waiving the Rule. For
the Seven Year Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995, 45 the Rules
Committee placed an explanation in the Congressional Record which stated that it
did not believe the bill contained a rate increase, but instead included a waiver in
an attempt to "avoid unnecessary points of order that might otherwise arise over
41The "equality of majorities" argument also only has force if majority waiver is not present.
John 0. Mcginnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative
Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 503 (1995).
42 I.R.C. § l(a)-(e) (1994).
43 I.R.C. § 11(b) (1994).
44 I.R.C. § 55(b) (1994).
4' H.R. 2491, 104' Cong. (1995).
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confusion or misinterpretations of what is meant by an income tax rate increase.',46
The Democrats had raised the Rule as a bar to portions of the Act involving
alterations in the Earned Income Tax Credit. The Committee used identical
language when claiming that waiver was simply being used preemptively in the
Medicare Preservation Act of 1995. 4" The claim was that penalties on Medicare
Savings Account withdrawals would constitute a tax rate increase. Neither of these
fell within the narrow interpretation given to the Rule by the Committee nor would
the current language of the rule cover them.
The 1996 experience with waiver was similar. The Small Business Job
Protection Act of 199648 provided tax credits for small businesses, particularly
those which hire disadvantaged workers, but also eliminated a group of tax
preferences for Puerto Rican businesses. The Republican leadership insisted that
despite the Democrats' claim, the Rule did not apply to the bill,49 and was waived
only as a cautionary measure. The most recent waiver occurred in the Health
Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996.50 The concern arose over two
measures: 1) attempting to prevent renunciation of citizenship as a tax evasion
measure, 2) applying penalties for early withdrawal of funds from Medical Savings
Accounts.5 These two bills also indicate that waiver is being used to escape
political bickering rather than as a mechanism to force through legislation that
should be subject to the Rule.52
The first time Congress waived the Rule, however, the legislation was
plausibly subject to the Rule. The 10 4 th Congress adopted the rule on opening day
and waived it almost immediately. H.R. 1215, the Contract with America Tax
Relief Act of 1995, repealed the 28% cap on the tax rate for capital gains income
and provided a 50% deduction of net capital gains. The overall 39.6% cap
remained in place, so the maximum effective rate was 19.8%. However, for some
classes of taxpayers, specifically those holding qualifying small business
investment stock, the 50% deduction already existed. Therefore, the tax rate might
46 141 Cong. Rec. H10853-03 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1995).
47 H.R. 2425, 104 'h Cong. (1995).
48 H.R. 3448, 104th Cong. (1996).
49 142 Cong. Rec. H5432-03 (daily ed. May 22, 1996).
'0 H.R. 3103, 104' Cong. (1996).
51142 Cong. Rec. H3029-03, H3029 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996).
52 One reference indicated that the welfare reform bill, H.R. 3734: the Personal
Responsibility Act, may have involved a waiver of the Rule. However, no debate or vote
in the Congressional Record about such a waiver exists. Since waiver was discussed
extensively every other time it happened, and the welfare reform bill was high profile
legislation, the reference must be in error.
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have increased for them, but they were provided an election option for the year of
enactment. Republicans argued, and the Joint Committee on Taxation concluded,
that the repeal of the 28% cap was not a rate increase. It simply repealed one
maximum, leaving a different (and higher) maximum in place. The Joint
Committee took the position that the 28% cap was not even a "rate" under the
definition of the rule, since it did not appear in the section of the Code defining rate
schedules.53 This led to the restricted interpretation of the provision discussed
above. The new version of the Rule clearly would not apply to this change. While
most of the instances where the Rule has been waived occurred in situations where
the rule was unlikely to be applied in any case, the ease and frequency of waiver
underscore the relative ineffectiveness of a rule-based implementation of
supermajority requirements.
III. THE LESSONS FROM THE STATES: How TIGHTLY SHOULD CONGRESS BE
BOUND?
While the enactment of a supermajority requirement to raise taxes is a new
idea at the federal level, states have had similar provisions since the 194 century.
Sixteen states currently impose either a supermajority requirement, a revenue cap,
or both. Tables I and II on the following pages summarize the provisions that are
in effect in the various states. After the tables, the author considers the types of
restrictions that states have imposed and the lessons that come out of the state
experiences. First, the author analyzes the decision whether to impose the
requirement at the statutory or the constitutional level and conclude that the
provisions that are imposed by statutes are no less binding than constitutional
amendments. Next the author examines the substantive content of the requirements
and the types of legislation to which they apply. While the states do not provide a
perfect model for the federal government, they can help guide the design of a
federal limitation.
53141 Cong. Rec. HI1989-01, H11998 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1995).
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TABLE I
State (Type) Super- What Taxes?
majority
Required
Arizona 2/3 New taxes, rate increases, deduction
(Constitutional eliminations, fee adjustments, or reallocation
Supermajority) of state/local burdens
Arkansas 3/4 Property, excise, privilege or personal tax
(Constitutional rates
Supermajority)
California 2/3 "Any changes enacted for the purpose of
(Constitutional increasing revenues" AND expenditure
Supermajority growth is limited by sum of cost of living and
AND Revenue population growth; 50% of revenues collected
Limit) in excess of this limit is placed in an
emergency fund-the other 50% is returned
by revisions of tax rate/fee schedules.
Colorado Voter Tax revenue cannot grow faster than
(Constitutional Approval population or it must be returned AND voter
Revenue Limit approval must be obtained for non-emergency
AND Statutory tax increases
Supermajority)
Delaware 3/5 All new taxes and license fees and all
(Constitutional increases in the effective rate
Supermajority)
Florida Voter Revenue growth faster than personal income
(Constitutional Approval (requires 2/3 of legislature to waive) AND
Revenue Limit new taxes or fees (requires 2/3 voter approval
AND to pass)
Constitutional
Supermajority)
Hawaii 2/3 Expenditure growth cannot exceed growth
(Constitutional rate of the economy; if state surplus exceeds
Revenue Limit) 5% of revenues in two successive years, there
must be a credit or refund.
Louisiana 2/3 Any new tax, increase in existing tax, repeal
(Constitutional of an exemption, fee or civil fine AND
Supermajority revenue growth rate is limited to growth rate
AND Statutory of personal income
Revenue Limit) 1
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Massachusetts Voter Revenue growth faster than wages/salaries
(Statutory Approval
Revenue Limit)
Michigan Voter Revenue growth faster than personal income
(Constitutional Approval must be returned
Revenue Limit)
Mississippi 3/5 Any revenue bill or bill providing for
(Constitutional assessment of property for taxation
Supermajority)
Missouri Voter Tax increases which exceed the lesser of 1%
(Constitutional Approval of total state revenues or 50 million dollars
Supermajority AND if state revenue grows faster than
AND personal income, the surplus must be
Constitutional returned.
Revenue Limit)
Nevada 2/3 Bills generating revenue
(Constitutional
Supermajority)
Oklahoma 3/4 All revenue bills
(Constitutional
Supermajority)
South Dakota 2/3 Corporate or personal income tax, the levies
(Constitutional or percentage basis of property
Supermajority)
Washington 2/3 Expenditures cannot grow faster than the
(Statutory prior three years' average sum of inflation
Revenue Limit and population growth; excess revenue is
AND Statutory diverted to an emergency reserve fund until it
Supermajority) reaches 5% of state revenues and then to
"education construction fund" AND all
actions which raises state revenue or requires
revenue neutral tax shifts
TABLE II
State How Enacted Is It Judicially
Enforced?
Arizona 1992 Initiative Not litigated
Arkansas 1939 or before Yes
California 1978 Initiative; 1979 Initiative Yes
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Colorado 1992 Initiative; 1993 Statute Not litigated
Delaware 1981 Constitutional Amendment Yes
Florida 1996 Initiative (supermajority Yes
requirement); 1994 Initiative (revenue
limit)
Hawaii 1978 Initiative Not Litigated
Louisiana 1921 or before (supermajority Yes
requirement);
1979 statute (revenue limit)
Massachusetts 1986 Initiative Not Litigated
Michigan 1978 Initiative Not litigated
Mississippi 1892 or before No
Missouri 1996 Initiative (supermajority Not Litigated
requirement); 1980 Initiative (revenue
limit)
Nevada 1996 Initiative Not litigated
Oklahoma 1992 Initiative Yes
South Dakota 1978 Initiative Yes
Washington 1993 Initiative Not Litigated
A. Level of Implementation: The De Facto Constraint in the States
Significantly, no states have enacted legislative procedural rules limiting
tax increases. All have either constitutional or statutory restrictions.54 Despite the
relative ineffectiveness of the House Rule, a federal revenue restriction need not be
imposed by constitutional amendment. The experiences in the states indicate that
a statute should be sufficient. If a revenue cap is the selected mechanism of control,
whether the cap is implemented by statute or by amendment does not matter much.
Statutory revenue limits might appear less permanent than constitutional
restrictions. Unlike constitutional caps, which require voter approval of an
amendment to eliminate, 55 a simple majority of the legislature can rewrite a
statutory limit. Despite this flexibility, the experience in the states indicates that
there are only minimal practical differences between the two types of revenue
limits.
541t is possible that other states have procedural rules or may adopt them in the future.55However, some states provide that the legislature may waive the revenue cap by a
supermajority. See e.g., FLA. CONST. Art. 7, § I (requiring two thirds to waive); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. 43.135.045 (1996) (requiring two thirds to waive).
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Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Washington have statutory revenue limits.
While this provides a small sample size, the structural characteristics of the limits
in these three states do not differ significantly from those in states with
constitutional restrictions. Louisiana limits its rate of revenue growth to personal
income, which is the most common choice, existing in four of the nine states with
constitutional revenue caps. Massachusetts selected a similar growth rate: wages
and salaries. Washington's statute is almost identical to California's constitution.
Both are primarily expenditure caps and tie expenditure growth to inflation and
population. Massachusetts is the only state of the three that provides an explicit
mechanism for providing refunds. Like Michigan and Missouri, the constitutional
states with explicit refund mechanisms, Massachusetts must return surpluses
proportionate to income tax liability. Regardless of the state, when a surplus
appears, the debate on how to spend or return the funds varies little based on
whether the revenue cap is statutory or constitutional. The proposal that succeeds
is almost always a proportionate tax refund or tax cut.5 6  For instance,
Massachusetts provided $150 million in refunds last year that were proportionate
to income tax liability. 7 Louisiana also has a surplus this year but has not yet
decided how to return it.
There is also only a limited difference in the types of judicial enforcement
of statutory versus constitutional provisions. Courts consider what should be
counted under the limit, rather than determining whether the limit has been
violated. 8 This is similar in the cases with constitutional restrictions.5 9 No state
Supreme Court, in either a statutory or constitutional state, has directly enforced a
revenue cap. The only significant structural difference between statutory and
constitutional caps is that there has been less litigation in states with statutory
limits. Louisiana has had none and Massachusetts's provision overcame a
56 Hal Spencer, Democrats Push for Tax Surplus Rebate, COLUMBIAN, Dec. 2, 1997 at B 1.
57Edward T. McHugh, Legislature Sends Weld $401M Deficiency Budget, WORCESTER
SUNDAY TELEGRAM, July 21, 1996, at A 16. They have run a surplus this year, but have not
decided how to return it. The most likely possibility seems to be a permanent reduction in
the income tax. David G. Tuerck, Editorial, State Should Return $ to Taxpayers, BOSTON
HERALD, Sept. 14, 1997, at 31.58See, e.g., Klickitat County v. State, 862 P.2d 629 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
59 San Francisco Taxpayers Assoc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of San Francisco, 828 P.2d 147
(Cal. 1992) (determining what constitutes debt restriction and therefore what is outside the
scope of the constitutional provision).
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constitutional challenge. 60 A few Washington cases have looked at what constitutes
a transfer of responsibility between state and local governments.
Aside from these structural features, there is little practical difference in the
effects of the statutory and constitutional provisions. There is no evidence that
either of these provisions is waived on a regular basis. In ten years, Massachusetts
has waived Chapter 62F only once. In 1996, the legislature waived a large number
of statutes to expedite highway construction. Since none of the projects actually
raised revenue, it is not clear the supermajority statute would apply in any event.6'
Louisiana has never waived its limit and has in fact taken particular steps to protect
the provision. The state eliminated all special funds comprised of state revenues
except the Tax Surplus Fund.62 Washington also has never waived its revenue
limit.
63
The similarity of statutory and constitutional provisions in the states
experience may spring from their common source. Unlike the top down
implementation of the House Rule, the state level revenue controls have developed
as a result of popular movements. Every revenue cap except Louisiana's (as well
as every supermajority requirement except Delaware's) has been instituted by voter
initiative. If these provisions are the voice of the voters in some significant way,
waiving the statutory versions may lead to political costs that are too high.64
60See Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 516 N.E.2d 152 (Mass.
1987) (determining that the refund provision did not constitute an appropriation which the
constitution prohibited from being enacted through an initiative).
61 1996 MASS. LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 205, §72 (H.B. 6191 (West).
62 1988 LA. SESS. LAWS. SERV. 1st Ex. Sess. 5 (West).
63 However, Washington also requires thatfees, in addition to revenue, not grow faster than
the allowed rate unless a simple majority of the legislature approves. This provision has
been waived every year since the statute's enactment for at least one fee. See e.g., 1997
WASH. LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 454 § 1119 (S.H.B. 2259)(West)(waiving nurses fees); 1996 WASH.
LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 283 §217 (S.S.B. 6251)(West)(waiving hypnotherapist fees); 1995 WASH.
LEGIS. SERV 1St Sp. Sess. Ch. 1 §215 (S.S.B. 5103)(West)(waiving public water operator
certification fees).64However, if voters were constraining their legislators by reacting negatively to waivers,
they would have to be informed of the waivers first. The instances when the provisions have
been waived in Washington and Massachusetts were not covered in the popular press.
(Similarly, the waivers of the federal rule were not reported outside the Congressional
Record.). This indicates that the caps themselves, regardless of structure, are having an
effect independent of the general anti-tax sentiment in the states.
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B. What's In; What's Out: The De Jure Constraint in the States
After sorting out whether the supermajority requirement is imposed by
statute or by constitution, the next issue is what it should cover. What legislative
enactments need a supermajority and which require only 51% of a quorum? This
question has caused the most conflict at the state level. This section examines some
of the options and problems that have arisen with various attempts to define what
actions are subject to supermajority requirements. First the author considers the
debate over taxes versus fees. Broadly speaking, fees are behavior specific
exactions designed to cover the cost of a specific government service.65 Defining
the precise contours of this category, as well as whether supermajority requirements
should cover fees at all, has been the subject of much litigation. Next the author
considers unfunded mandates. The question of federal unfunded mandates imposed
on state governments has received substantial attention in the literature,66 yet
similar issues arise when state governments pass on obligations to localities.
Supermajority requirements make this a much more attractive option for state
legislatures. Then the author examines the limitations that supermajority
requirements place on revenue neutral tax shifts. Depending on how the provision
is phrased, the rule may prevent not only tax increases, but also reallocation of the
tax burden among different tax types or taxpayers. Finally, the author discusses a
variety of tools that legislators have used when faced with a supermajority
limitation, including "automatic" tax increases, delegation of taxing authority to
subdivisions, and shifts to debt financing.
The starting place in determining what a supermajority requirement covers
is the language of the requirement. Three basic types of supermajority
requirements exist. First, some states restrict legislation that is intended to raise
revenue. California, for instance, imposes its supermajority requirement on those
bills with the purpose of increasing revenue.67 Oklahoma's constitutional mandate
mentions "revenue bills, " which the Oklahoma Supreme Court has interpreted to
mean those bills with the purpose of raising revenue.68 Second, other states have
65See, e.g., Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350 (Cal. 1997).
66Much of this literature arose after the passage of the 1995 Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.), which was designed to
restrict Congress' ability to impose requirements on the states without paying for them.
See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50
VAND. L. REV. 1137 (1997); Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of
Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113 (1997).
67CAL. CONST. Art. 13A, § 3.68OKLA. CONST. Art. 5, § 33; Leveridge v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 294 P.2d 809 (Okla.
1956). Mississippi uses the same language, and would perhaps interpret it the same way, but
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looked to the effect of the bill. Delaware imposes a supermajority on new taxes or
increases in the effective rates of old ones.69 Nevada requires a supermajority on
any bill that "creates, generates or increases any public revenue in any form.
70
Finally, Washington limits actions that raise revenue or require revenue neutral tax
shifts.71 Obviously, effect based requirements are easier for courts to administer.
What the legislature did is simpler to discern than what it intended. However,
judicial review based on the effect of legislation means representatives do not know
whether they need a supermajority until after the fact. Missouri has implemented
a partial solution to this dilemma by requiring voter approval for bills that increase
revenues more than 50 million or 1% of state revenues. 2 Missouri presumes that
bills which have such a substantial revenue effect are designed, at least in part, to
increase revenue.
Finally, Arkansas, South Dakota, and Louisiana do not purport to impose
a supermajority requirement on all taxes. Arkansas limits its provision to property,
excise, privilege, or personal tax rates, excluding increases in the sales tax rate and
all base broadening efforts.73 South Dakota includes only rate increases and new
taxes.74 Louisiana, while imposing what seems to be a broad restriction on "a new
tax, an increase in an existing tax, or a repeal of an existing tax exemption,"75 seems
to have interpreted the restriction narrowly. A proposed 1996 amendment would
have extended the requirement to the suspension or repeal of existing tax credits,
deductions, or exclusions, but was withdrawn before it was presented for a floor
vote.76 This seems to indicate that "exemption" is interpreted, by the legislature at
least, as not extending to cover these other features of the tax code. The distinction
among these three types of requirements plays an important role in the drafting
issues that follow. Each raises its own particular problems.
the Mississippi Supreme Court has refused to enforce the supermajority requirement on
what amounts to political question grounds. Hunt v. Wright, 11 So. 608, 609 (Miss. 1892).
69 DEL. CONST. Art. 8, § 10.
7
°NEv. CONST. Art. 4, § 18.
71WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 43.135.045 (1996). Florida and Arizona also seem to fall into the
"effect" category, but are too new to have received court interpretation. Both were passed
within the last six years. Arizona mandates a 2/3 vote for any act that "provides for a net
increase in state revenues," listing a wide variety of types of bills that fall in the category,
but specifically excluding the effect of inflation. ARIZ. CONST. Art. 9, § 22.
72MO. CONST. Art. 10 § 18(e).
73ARK. CONST. Art. 5, § 38.
74S.D. CONST. Art. 11, § 13.
75LA. CONST. Art. 7, § 2.
76Keith Darce, Business Scores Again in the Legislature, New Orleans CityBusiness, June
17, 1996, at 1.
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1. Taxes and Fees
During Congressional hearings in 1987, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm
Baldridge was asked the difference between taxes and user fees. He responded that
it was simple: "If it is a Democratic proposal, it is a tax; if it is a Republican
proposal, it is a user fee. 7 7 Unfortunately, neither the states nor the federal
government have been able to agree on a distinction this straightforward. The issue
is one of the most litigated in the fiscal policy arena and the supermajority field is
no exception. Generally, fees are earmarked for a particular activity and the amount
collected is proportional to the service provided. Fees are designed to cover the
cost of a specific government service, not to provide general revenue to support a
broad range of activities. For supermajority purposes, the distinction between taxes
and fees should be drawn based on the goals underlying the requirement. If the
limitation is imposed to lock in a particular fiscal structure, (rather than to limit the
overall size of government) a majority of the legislature should only be allowed to
impose exactions that the compromise was not intended to cover. If, on the other
hand, the goal were to limit the size of the federal government, fees should be
construed narrowly. Restraining revenue is an attempt to reduce the influence of
the government in the economy and reduce the discretion of the legislature. This
section shows that the existing federal definitions of taxes and fees are inapposite
for the supermajority context and that the state definitions are no better.
The difference between taxes and user fees has been hotly contested across
the entire field of fiscal policy. No clear federal definition has been developed; fees
have been defined as widely as any exaction "charged identifiable individuals or
entities ... for a service or good" or as narrowly as "prices imposed to recover the
cost to the federal government of providing special benefits to an identifiable
recipient beyond those that accrue to the general public."08 Delegation doctrine has
been the primary arena where the federal courts have examined the definition of
"taxes" versus "fees." User fees only became a substantial portion of the federal
budget in the 1950s. Title V of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of
195279 gave the head of administrative agencies the power to set user fees for any
good or service provided, "taking into consideration direct and indirect cost to the
government, value to the recipient, public policy or interest served, and other
pertinent facts," and had the goal of making any such provision "self sustaining."
80
77CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE GROWTH OF FEDERAL USER CHARGES (1993).
781d.
7196 Stat. 1051, codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. 9701(a)(b) (1994).
80Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, Publ. L. No. 137, 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. (ch.
376 §501) 251, 277.
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The Supreme Court faced this provision in the 1974 companion cases National
Cable Television Ass'n v. United States"' and Federal Power Comm'n v. New
England Power Co. 2 In National Cable Television, the Court held that the statute
allowed agencies to impose fees, not taxes, defining fees as "incident to a voluntary
act" and imposed for "a grant which ... bestows a benefit on the applicant, not
shared by other members of society. 83 Furthermore, fees were limited to "the value
to the recipient" of the service provided.84 New England Power Co. further limited
the definition of fees, mandating that it be imposed on an "identifiable recipient"
of a unit of service for which "he derives a special benefit. '8 5 These definitions
were not intended to be drawn along the contours of a supermajority requirement
and do not further those goals. The question in the supermajority arena is whether
Congress is collecting funds to spend to further policy aims. If it is, those exactions
should be subject to the requirement. Whether there is an "identifiable recipient"
or they are receiving a particular benefit is not particularly relevant.
86
Several states have chosen to avoid this thorny interpretative dividing line
by specifically placing fee increases under the supermajority requirement. 7 Among
those that have not, four states have faced the question of what constitutes a fee.8
On the whole, the lines drawn between taxes and fees is inconsistent and unclear.
81415 U.S. 336 (1974).
82415 U.S. 345 (1974).
83National Cable Television, 415 U.S. at 340-41.841d. at 342.
85New England Power Co., 415 U.S. at 351.86Congress further increased its reliance on user fees in 1985 with COBRA-85. The law
authorized the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to collect up to 33% of its annual operating
costs in user fees. For general background on the history of this legislation, see CONG.
BUDGET OFF., THE GROWTH OF FEDERAL USER CHARGES 19 (1993). The Court interpreted
this bill in Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989). The Court backed
off of the distinction between taxes and fees for purposes of the delegation question, holding
National Cable Television and New England Power "stand only for the proposition that
Congress must indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the discretionary
authority to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of regulated
parties by imposing additional financial burdens, whether characterized as 'taxes' or 'fees,'
on those parties." Id. at 213.
87See, e.g., NEV. CONST. Art. 4, § 18.
"Delaware dealt with the question in In re Opinion of the Justices, 575 A.2d 1186 (De.
1990). This case was less interesting than the ones discussed in the main body, though,
since Delaware's constitutional provision specifically includes "license fees." DEL. CONST
ART. 8 § 11.
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Florida was the first to deal with the issue. State ex rel. v. Keller89 considered the
legality of a fee imposed upon attorneys to obtain a license to practice law. The
license fee increased in steps in proportion to the attorney's income. The court
found that this was in fact a tax on income, not simply a regulatory fee, because the
amount of tax varied based on the income of the attorney. A fee on the privilege
of doing business would not have been covered.9" Of course, if the goal of the
supermajority requirement is to limit the size of the government, this distinction
makes little sense.
This Florida test, however, has not been adopted in other states. California
and Louisiana look primarily at the purposes underlying the tax. "If the imposition
has not for its principal object the raising of revenue, but is merely incidental to the
making of rules and regulations to promote public order, individual liberty and
general welfare, it is an exercise of the police power." 91 In Bernard, the Louisiana
Court rejected an assessment levied by the state Insurance Rating Commission that
was not passed by an adequate supermajority. Traditionally, the IRC levied
percentage assessments on the previous year's premiums to fund its own operations.
In 1979, the commission added an additional fee to fund the firefighters' pension
plan.92 The court looked at the fact that the fee did not have the "purpose of
defraying the cost of insurance regulation,, 93 and in fact raised four times as much
money as would be necessary to cover its costs. The attorney for the state tried to
claim that the insurers benefitted from a healthy firefighters' pension system
because it encouraged people to become firefighters. The Court rejected this, on
the grounds that "[i]t is not an imposition limited to the extraction of fees from
persons receiving a special benefit from government not shared by other members
of society," particularly since it did not tax only fire insurers. 94 While this case was
decided correctly in light of the goals of the supermajority requirement, its
reasoning is mistaken. If the supermajority requirement is designed to restrict the
size of government, this "special benefit" test does not fulfill these purposes.
California has most recently considered the distinction between taxes and
fees. Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization95 looked at a lead paint agency
created by the state. The agency was to develop programs for screening and
89191 So. 542 (Fla. 1939).
901d. at 547.
91Audubon Insurance Co. v. Bernard, 434 So. 2d 1072, 1074 (La. 1983).921d. at 1075.
9 31d941d. at 1075-76.
95937 P.2d 1350 (Cal. 1997).
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education relating to the dangers of lead paint. The program was funded through
a tax on the current and former producers of lead-based paint in California. The
amount of spending on the program was limited by the revenues generated through
this assessment, and the revenues from the assessment were not to be used for any
other purpose. Fees were imposed to the extent of "market share" responsibility for
the current contamination levels in the state. The Court surveyed the history of the
distinction between taxes and fees, holding that taxes are imposed for revenue
purposes rather than in return for a specific benefit or privilege conferred on the
taxed individuals.96 Taxes are compulsory rather than imposed in response to a
voluntary decision to seek government services.97 The Court found three type of
non-tax fees: 1) Special assessments imposed to compensate the government for
benefits conferred onto property, e.g. fees for street building; 2) Development fees,
e.g. building permit fees; 3) Regulatory fees. 98  Since the expenditures were
restricted in amount and fee expenditures were limited to the lead agency, the Court
analogized the tax to an initial licensing fee. It saw the fee as regulatory because
it mitigated the effects of Sinclair's behavior and was essentially a cost of doing
business.99
The Sinclair case indicates the one situation where perhaps user fees should
be treated separately from taxes for supermajority purposes. If the goal of the
requirement is to limit the government's collection of revenue, courts should look
at the effect the fee has on society. Is the legislature collecting money and using it
to further policy goals? If so, it should be subject to the limitation. In cases where
the legislature's exaction is essentially standing in for the tort system, 100 the
legislature has no additional discretion and is simply reducing the costs of
collecting a debt that is already due. However, Sinclair is probably not one of those
situations. The funds collected did not go to compensate those injured by lead
paint. Instead, they were used to set up education programs to prevent future
injuries. That is a policy decision by the legislature and the fact that they called the
funding mechanism a fee rather than a tax should not make a difference.' 0 '
"Id. at 1354.
9 7
1d.
981d. The standard for regulatory fees was held to be that they cannot exceed the cost of
providing services necessary to the activity regulated. Id. at 1355.
991d. at 1357.
'O°CBO has called these "liability-based taxes." CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE GROWTH OF
FEDERAL USER CHARGES 6-7 (1993).
1""The danger of skyrocketing user fees is not trivial. Even without the pressure imposed
by a supermajority limitation on taxes, federal user fees increased at almost twice the rate
of either GDP or overall federal receipts. See id. at 41.
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2. Unfunded Mandates
Supermajorities are generally not required to devolve a program to a
locality. While none of the states with standard supermajority requirements have
been confronted with cases involving shifting of obligations to state and local
governments, the language of the provisions seem not to regulate shifts of
responsibility. Most of these supermajority provisions focus on affirmative steps
taken to increase gross receipts. 10 2 Of course, bills which reduce the state's
obligation to provide services do not have this purpose. Even in states with vaguer
enactments, the supermajority requirement is unlikely to restrict these types of
shifts. For instance, Oklahoma's provision applying to "revenue bills,"10 3 under a
very expansive reading, could restrict shifts of obligations since they are bills that
free up state revenues. However, it has been construed to make it essentially
equivalent to the California constitution.'04
Arizona is the only state with a supermajority provision which specifically
regulates the interaction between states and localities. It applies its supermajority
requirement to "change[s] in the allocation among the state, counties or cities of
Arizona transaction privilege, severance,jet fuel and use, rental occupancy, or other
taxes."'1 5  As discussed below, states with revenue caps tend to restrict
responsibility shifts to local governments. In contrast, this provision limits the
ability to rewrite the tax law to take funds from localities. However, this language
may not have a significant effect because these types of transfers of revenues may
be covered even if they are not specifically mentioned. As noted above,
supermajority requirements fall into two categories. Some states, including
Delaware and Nevada, look only at the effect of tax changes: supermajority
requirements apply to all legislation raising revenue. Other states, like Oklahoma
and California, focus on the intent of the legislature in enacting the change. Bills
converting local tax revenue to the state coffers would almost certainly be subject
to the requirement in states where the provision is aimed at the effect of changes,
and it is likely that the requirement would apply in states with intent oriented
constitutions as well. However, it is possible that a transfer of funds could be
justified in intent oriented states on the grounds that it did not have the purpose of
'02California is typical among these, applying the supermajority requirement to "changes in
state taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues." CAL. CONST. Art. 13A, § 3. See
supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
10 3OKLA. CONST. Art. 5, § 33
'04Leveridge v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 294 P.2d 809, 809 (Okla. 1956) (defining revenue bills
as those with the primary purpose of raising revenue).
'ARIZ. CONST. Art. 9 § 22(B).
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raising revenue, particularly if the transfer is accompanied by a shift of
responsibility for certain programs. For instance, redirecting gas tax revenues from
the counties to the state might, or might not, be designed to raise state revenue. If
counties had traditionally administered road repair programs and the legislation
transferred responsibility for these programs to the state along with the tax receipts,
the purpose of the bill might well be administrative savings, not revenue
enhancement.
If the goal of the supermajority limitation is to restrict the overall size of
government, this failure to account for unfunded mandates is a serious weakness.
State governments can simply shift the burden on to the localities, forcing them to
raise the tax revenue. If the objective is to freeze in place the current allocation of
the tax burden among various taxpayers, either for equity or for other reasons, this
problem is less severe but should remain a source of concern. There is no guarantee
that the taxpayers bearing the burden of devolved programs are the same as those
that would pay if the state retained the programs. In fact, since most localities fund
their programs through property taxes, and most states collect the majority of their
tax revenue from sales and income taxes, it is likely that very different types of
taxpayers will pay for burdens placed on localities. 10 6
3. Revenue Neutral Tax Shifting
In addition to locking in revenue levels as a proportion of state income,
supermajority requirements in theory should lock in the distribution of revenues
across different tax types. States cannot cut taxes in one area and increase another
tax to keep revenues constant. This subsection analyzes whether supermajority
requirements actually constrain states' ability to shift the revenue burden among tax
types. 0 7 Every state with a supermajority requirement but one has comprehensive
106The applicability of supermajority provisions to situations when the state claims both the
responsibility and the revenue for formerly local programs highlights the importance of the
intent of the provisions. The provisions should not apply if the purpose is to lock in the
current tax structure and assure that taxpayers continue to bear the same relative share of the
cost of government. Similarly, if the goal is to restrict the size of "government," they should
not apply, since it does not really matter at what level services are provided. However, they
should apply if the goal is to limit the size of state government, stemming from a belief that
government operates better at a lower, decentralized, level. This view of the requirements,
though, is undercut by the fact that most states with these provisions also apply them to city
and county tax increases.
107In this area, states with revenue limits are the least interesting. Revenue limits implicitly
accept shifting among different tax types as long as the cap is not exceeded. The exception
to this occurs when states adopt supermajority requirements over and above their revenue
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provisions. 108 All attempts to raise state revenue are subject to the limit. As noted
above, tax shifts seldom appear in case law, and generally are absent from the press
as well. While tax increases and tax cuts are covered, they are seldom explicitly
linked. In fact, politicians have a strong incentive not to indicate when the
adjustments are tied together. They can take credit for cutting taxes and argue that
they were forced to raise them when revenue shortfalls appear. As a result,
measuring the effect of a supermajority limit on tax shifting is difficult.
However, looking at the data can be instructive. The following table
compares five of the states with supermajority requirements to five states that do
not have the limits. The analysis looks at the distribution of state revenue
longitudinally across different tax types. The hypothesis is that in states with
supermajority requirements, the distribution of state revenues across tax types
should remain more stable than in states without such a requirement, because
supermajority states cannot, for example, easily compensate for a sales tax cut by
broadening the income tax base.10 9
The five supermajority states were selected based on the data available.
Only the states with the requirement through the entire period of 1981 to 1992 are
included. Arkansas was also excluded because, as explained above, its provision
caps. In these cases, eliminating shifting is essentially the only additional effect of the
requirements. However, it is not evident that the voters enacting these provisions recognize
this. Missouri adopted its supermajority requirement for tax increases in 1996 on top of its
1980 Hancock Amendment imposing a revenue limitation. One primary argument in favor
of the 1996 provision was that a large increase in income taxes in 1993 had, in part, caused
a current surplus leading to a sales tax cut. Jo Mannies, Amendment 4 Ads Carry a Lot of
Baggage, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 27, 1996, at B5. However, the tenor of the
campaign was much more "anti-tax" than "anti-tax shifting." Similarly, Florida adopted its
supermajority mandate in 1996, two years after adopting a revenue limit. The revenue limit
was presented as a reason the supermajority requirement was unnecessary. Diane Hirth,
State Tax-Cap Amendment Has Dole's Support, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 3,
1996, at A17. Here too, though, the focus of the campaign was on restricting taxes rather
than locking in the current distribution across tax types.
10 Arkansas limits its supermajority provision to tax rates and to particular tax types. See
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
'
1gThe percentages do not sum to one hundred because, in addition to these three tax types,
revenues include intergovernmental transfers, both up from localities and down from the
United States, other taxes, and user fees. The ACIR data used distinguishes between these
'other taxes' and 'charges.' It seemed unlikely that the distinction would be the same as the
distinction made by courts between taxes and fees. These three tax types are revenue
mechanisms that would be universally considered taxes.
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is explicitly non-comprehensive. The five non-supermajority states were selected
because each had a 1992 tax distribution that was similar to one of the
supermajority states. In the attached table, the state that the non-supermajority state
is similar to is noted parenthetically after the state code. The assumption in
selecting states on this basis is that it is possible that states tend toward similar
distributions across tax types over time, and that states that start out far from other
states are likely to have higher than average variance.1 °
The final results are reproduced in the table."'
Supermajority Average Variance Average Variance Non-
State Supermajority
State
CA 2.06 .92 MD
DE 2.13 2.74 OR
LA 1.58 1.03 AL
MS 2.00 4.77 NM
SD 1.17 1.99 TN
Supermajority 1.79 2.29 Non-
Average Supermajority
Average
The states without supermajority requirements do in fact have significantly
higher variability in their tax distribution than states with such a limit, which
supports the hypothesis that these requirements do significantly restrain tax choices.
However, this data is somewhat suspect. New Mexico has an unusually high
variance and Maryland has an unusually low variance. Excluding the two of them
makes the average variance in non-supermajority states 1.92, which is higher but
"Oft would be possible to compare the variance in each state's distribution to the national
variance, but the national variance is likely to appear deceptively low since opposite
direction effects in different states will cancel each other out in aggregate.
"' The average variance is the average across the three tax types. However, in states
lacking a particular tax type across the entire time period, like Delaware and Oregon, no
average was computed in the zero variance from these taxes. This essentially is an
assumption that the lack of a property and sales tax in Delaware cannot be attributed to the
supermajority limit, but rather to the existence of exogenous political factors making that
type of tax "out of bounds." Imposing a brand new tax type is likely far more difficult than
making an equal size change in a pre-existing tax.
[Vol. 14
STATE SUPERMAJORITY REQUIREMENTS
not as much. It is difficult to determine whether New Mexico is an outlier or not
given the number of data points.
Another issue is that the variance of the percentage collected from property
taxes is low in every state. It may that property tax increases are effectively not an
option for states, since local governments have so jealously guarded property taxes
as a revenue source and since the state (as opposed to the localities) collect so little
money through this mechanism. The chart is reproduced with the average variances
excluding property taxes.
Supermajority Average Variance Average Variance Non-
State Supermajority
State
CA 3.00 1.36 MD
DE 2.13 2.74 OR
LA 2.34 1.55 AL
MS 2.86 7.12 NM
SD 1.17 1.99 TN
Supermajority 2.3 2.95 Non-
Average Supermajority
Average
The difference between the supermajority and the non-supermajority states is even
greater here, although New Mexico is having an even more significant effect in this
case. On the whole, it does seem that the supermajority requirement does have
some effect on the ability of states to shift among taxes, but the extent of that effect
is not entirely clear. Here too, whether limitations on revenue neutral tax shifts are
considered a problem or not depends on the goal of the supermajority requirement.
If the objective is to limit the size of government, this is a dangerous unintended
consequence. If the goal is to fix a particular tax structure in place, this is exactly
the desired result.
4. Evasion Tools
Standard supermajority requirements can be evaded in a variety of ways.
This subsection analyzes legislative attempts to find different ways to increase state
revenues when a supermajority requirement bars traditional tax increases. First, the
author considers several "hidden" ways to raise taxes that lead to additional revenue
but do not need a supermajority. Second, the author examines attempts to substitute
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other funding measures for taxes. Finally, Louisiana has been especially active in
trying to adjust state revenue upwards and the author discusses its efforts in
detail.
1 2
The legislature can evade a supermajority by finding ways to raise taxes
that do not require a supermajority vote. Late last year, Colorado considered tying
gasoline taxes to the rate of inflation.113 The proposal was defended on the grounds
that gas taxes, imposed on a per gallon basis, currently erode as prices increase
where sales and income taxes do not. This automatic tax increase subverts the
supermajority mandate. It might require a supermajority vote in the first year, but
might not, as there is no guarantee that state revenues will increase. While
Colorado did not adopt this provision last year, Delaware had a similar measure
through the 1980s.14 For 15 years, the per gallon tax was 10% of the average price
per gallon, blending traditional gas taxes with a sales tax. This system was first
imposed in the same year that the supermajority requirement came in, but was
abandoned in 1995 when gasoline taxes were increased well past the 10% level.
Other states with supermajority requirements have not followed Delaware's lead.
Arizona, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma and South Dakota all have traditional per
gallon taxes." 5 Admittedly, in many states, gas taxes are dedicated to highway
"'here are two types of "evasion" mechanisms not considered in the text. The first is voter
approval. For instance, in Arizona, while it takes 2/3 of the legislature to pass tax increases,
a simple majority can send voters a tax increase and a simple majority of voters can approve.
This has been pointed out as a weakness in the Arizona structure and there have been
attempts to require a 2/3 vote of the people for any tax increase. Phil Immordino, It's Time
for Legislature to Revisit Tax Increase Law, TUCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 29, 1996, at A7.
However, no examples of taxes that have been imposed in this way exist, and it seems
unlikely to provide a significant source of new revenue, given the general unpopularity of
tax increases and the administrative complexities of voter referenda. Second, there have
been attempts to pass constitutional amendments to exempt certain types of taxes from both
revenue caps and supermajority requirements. Colorado Governor Roy Romer fought to
remove unemployment insurance fund taxes from the limits, arguing that both the receipts
and the expenditures of the fund are particularly volatile. Editorial, 'No' on Referendum D,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 12, 1996, at A57. These attempts have universally failed.
"
3Ellen Miller, Romer Urges Indexing Gas Taxes to Inflation, DENVER POST, Sept. 9, 1997,
at Al.
114 Del. Code. Ann. Tit. 30 §5110 (1995).
"
5See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §28-1501 (1990); MISS. CODEANN. §27-55-11 (1972); NEV.
REV. STAT. §365.170 (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, §500.4 (1997), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
10-47B-4 (Michie 1995).
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construction, limiting the utility of this mechanism for this specific tax type, but
there is no reason it could not be used for other types of taxes.
116
Another form of automatic tax increases also apply to gas taxes. Nevada
and Oklahoma have adopted measures providing that if there is any reduction in
federal gas taxes, state gas taxes will increase by the amount federal taxes are
reduced." 7 It is not clear whether the supermajority provisions would apply to
these measures. Nevada passed the statute before enacting its supermajority
provision, but, in the language of the Nevada Constitution, the statute does not
"create, generate, or increase public revenue," since, at the time of bill's passage,
it does not alter state revenue at all. Oklahoma limits its provision to bills that are
designed to raise revenue, and if this provision is defended on environmental
grounds, for instance, it seems likely to succeed against a court challenge. Even if
the provisions do need such a vote once, that is a far easier task than having to
return annually to obtain another increase. These contingent tax increases are a
straightforward loophole. Presumably it would even be possible to pass measures
similar to those used for Congressional pay raises. Unless the legislature
affirmatively rejected them, tax increases could annually go into effect either
automatically or on the motion of a commission. This would present a particular
problem in states like Arkansas, which also mandate a supermajority vote to cut
taxes.
States that limit the effect of their provisions based on the intent of the
legislature provide more opportunities for undercutting the measure. For instance,
in 1987, Arkansas attempted to incorporate federal definitions of taxable income
into their tax code. 118 This did not trigger the Arkansas provision, which only
applies to tax rates, and did not even pass by a majority, but presents a potential
evasion tactic for states which have supermajority requirements that emphasize the
intent of the legislature in making the change. Oklahoma limits its requirement to
bills for raising revenue and California's provision applies to changes in state taxes
enacted for the purposes of raising revenues. The Oklahoma courts have in fact
held that a revenue bill is one whose "principal purpose is to increase state tax
revenue.""' 9 In the Arkansas proposal, it was clear that the legislature was trying
to raise revenue, but a similar provision could easily be defended as an attempt to
"161t is also less effective in states that have a revenue cap in addition to a supermajority
requirement.
"
7NEV. REV. STAT. § 365.185 (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 500.4A (1997).
"8Maria Henson, Main Pillar of Clinton Revenue Plan Fails in Senate Despite Lobbying,
ARK. GAZETTE, Feb. 27, 1987 at Al.
"9 Walters v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 935 P.2d 398, 401 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
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simplify the administration of the tax code. The increase upheld in the
Walters case, for instance, raised about $18 million in additional revenue from out-
of-state taxpayers by adjusting the method used to calculate their marginal tax rate.
While this was defended on equity grounds, and that did seem to be the primary
motivating factor in the legislature's actions, it provides a way to obtain small
revenue increases. Of course, in states like Nevada and Delaware, where the
provision applies to all legislation that has the effect of raising revenues, this tactic
is unavailable. These provisions, however have a disadvantage: it is not necessarily
clear in advance whether bills will have the effect of increasing revenues. A strict
reading of these provisions could lead to retroactive nullification.
Once legislatures exhaust these tax-based revenue mechanisms, non-tax
sources of revenue are a natural place for state legislatures to look. In particular,
states might be expected to rely more heavily on bonds and fees. There are reasons
to think that bonds cannot be used to replace lost tax revenue. Most states have
limitations on the use of non-recurring debt to fund recurring expenses and many
have limitations on the overall debt burden the state can assume. Even in states
without such a limit, the market imposes an effective cap on bond issuance. The
table below compares 1992 state debt burden as a percentage of state general
revenues in six states with supermajority requirements to the national average for
states.
State 1992 Debt Burden as a Percentage of
State Revenue
Arizona 35.7
Arkansas 37.4
Delaware 144.1
Mississippi 30.7
Oklahoma 53.5
South Dakota 124.4
National Average 61.4
The data are inconclusive. While Delaware and South Dakota have debt burdens
that far exceed the national average, the other states have very low levels of debt.
This highlights the problems of the endogenous variable of state fiscal discipline.
States with a preference for supermajority requirements are likely to favor relatively
low debt levels as well. It is therefore hard to extract the effect of the supermajority
requirements.
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Louisiana has engaged in the most varied attempts to try to undercut the
supermajority limitation. The most interesting of these was the six year saga of the
Louisiana Recovery District. The recovery district was former Gov. Buddy
Roemer's solution to the 1988 fiscal crisis. The district was formed to borrow about
$1 billion to cover a deficit in the state's operating budget. Proceeds from recovery
district bonds were used to balance the budget three years in a row. The original
enabling legislation gave the district the authority to impose a sales tax to pay off
these bonds. In 1993, by less than a two thirds margin, the legislature authorized
the recovery district to waive a sales tax exemption on certain items, effectively
imposing a new tax. The vote was a last ditch solution to another fiscal crisis when
the legislature was unable to obtain a 2/3 majority for a direct tax increase. 120
While these maneuvers successfully balanced the budget, they caused tremendous
political heat, and led to a 1994 constitutional amendment abolishing the district
and imposing a 2/3 vote of the legislature to create a similar institution in the
future. 
121
Louisiana combined this attempt with another means of "evading" the
provision. Traditionally Louisiana has renewed a number of sales taxes on a year
to year basis. However, in an attempt to avoid the difficulty of repeated approval,
they began to provide a two year cycle for these taxes. 122 While this does not evade
the provision in the sense that the legislature could make these permanent at any
time, a variation from tradition in this way does undermine the intent of the
requirement. A federal supermajority mandate would likely lead to the
transformation of several tax provisions that are now "temporary" into more
permanent measures.
In the end, legislatures can evade the supermajority requirements only if
they are interpreted narrowly. Arizona, for instance, has interpreted it broadly.
Bills were even held up that simply increased civil penalties, including one that
mandated DWI violators pay for emergency response services. 123 Drafting a
provision that strikes a balance between this type of problem and those presented
'
20The district also flaunted other constitutional provisions, including a prohibition on
covering operating deficits with borrowing. Jack Wardlaw, Keeping the State in Business
for the Next Fiscal Year, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 6, 1993, at B7.
121 Ed Anderson & Jack Wardlaw, Amendments Pass Amid Poor Turnout, NEW ORLEANS
TiMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 2, 1994, at A12.
122Jack Wardlaw, Taxes on Food, Utilities AreRenewed by House, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Apr. 24, 1992, at B8.
123 Mary K. Reinhart, Legal Questions Cloud 'Supermajority' Tax Initiative, ARIz. DAILY
STAR, Feb. 8, 1993, at Al.
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when the legislature can simply enshrine automatic tax increases into the code is
extremely complicated.
IV. REVENUE CAPS
Supermajority requirements are not the only way that legislatures entrench
a revenue structure. Nine states124 have adopted revenue caps, which directly limit
the size of the government. Money collected in excess of the limit cannot be spent
and, as will be discussed below, must be returned to the public in some way. Part
discussed the two potential goals of supermajority requirements: limiting
government and entrenching a particular set of policy preferences. Revenue caps
differ from supermajority requirements primarily in that they are only aimed at the
first goal. All caps do is limit government. In this way, while they have their own
particular problems, revenue caps are more straightforward and are easier to
analyze. Having only one goal means that their problems are more transparent.
First, the author considers what states do when excess revenue comes in.
Any revenue cap needs to deal with this contingency, but must do so in a way that
the refund mechanism used is not simply a proxy for spending. Here the lessons for
a federal revenue cap are somewhat disheartening. While political pressures have
constrained legislative behavior, the formal mandates of the refunds provisions
have generally not affected the way money is returned to constituents. Next, the
author considers how states have defined what is, and what is not, revenue. The
problems the states have faced are significant, but are small compared to the
definitional issues arising from a federal revenue limit. 125
A. Returning Surpluses
For tax supermajority requirements, once the definitional problems are
solved, enforcement is not very difficult. Bills passed in violation of the mandate
are invalid. In contrast, even after courts and legislatures have decided what is
'
24Califomia, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, and
Washington.
125The constitutionality of a revenue cap is an open question. While the imposition of a
statutory maximum would likely pass constitutional muster, finding an officer who can
enforce such a cap if Congress were to step over the limit is difficult. Obviously, judicial
enforcement would face the same political question issues that arise in the supermajority
context, see supra note 31. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,732-33 (1986) makes clear that
neither the Comptroller General nor any other "Congressional" officer can have the power
of recission.
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"revenue," the question of what happens if excess revenue is collected remains
open. Here too the issue is how much discretion future legislatures retain. When
legislatures are left unrestrained in how they handle surpluses, the process turns
highly political with legislators attempting to use various refund methods to gain
popular support. However, even when rules restrain the refund process, the
legislators retain the ability to "refund" the surplus through pre-emptive tax cuts.
While few states have been through the refund process, the restraints seem to matter
little. Just last year, in Colorado, which lacks restraints, the surplus was returned
through the simplest possible method: in rough proportion to income tax liability.
However, in Missouri, which requires surpluses be returned in proportion to income
taxes, the state adopted non-income tax cuts to achieve other policy goals.
Colorado and Missouri, along with 42 other states, have accumulated
substantial surpluses this year. 126 Colorado's constitution does not mandate how the
money should be returned.1 27 The plan the legislature adopted provides that those
with an income under $15,000 receive a $37 refund, from $15,000 to $100,000, the
refund was $60, and over $100,000, it was $80.128 The state considered several
alternative suggestions. The governor strongly supported a public referendum to
keep the money for education or transportation.1 29 The most competitive counter-
proposals involved tax cuts. One was a retroactive reduction in income tax rates,
126 Michelle Johnston, State Revenue Surplus Spurs Talk of Tax Cuts, DENVER POST, Sept.
25, 1997, at Al.1271t does state that refunds need not be proportional when prior payments are impractical
to identify and return. This language could be interpreted as requiring proportional returns
when the income tax produces the surplus revenue, but not when the sales tax does. The
Colorado legislature, however, does not seem to have read this language as binding their
actions at all. Governor Romer refused to permit the special session of the legislature to
discuss the creation of a permanent refund mechanism. Thomas Frank, Tax Refund Tug of
War Shaping Up, DENVER POST, Sept. 4, 1997, at BI. This probably was a political
decision; Republicans dominate the Colorado legislature and Romer is a Democrat.
128Editorial, A 'Marriage Bonus'Refund, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 10/27/97 at 38A. The
legislature actually ended up returning $3 million more than was required.
29Genevieve Anton, Refund Talk Has Bruce Smiling, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE, Oct. 19,
1997, at Al. The state has never run a referendum on whether to keep surpluses, but 70%
of Colorado's local governments have. These referenda tend to give specific spending
priorities on which the surplus will be spent, most commonly education. When
municipalities ask to keep money, they are allowed to retain the money 92% of the time.
Id. This indicates that the broad public support for supermajority requirements is somewhat
suspect. Voters may be more concerned over government waste than the size of government
and frequently support spending when they know where it is going.
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which would have produced a result somewhat similar to the one finally reached. 130
The other was a midyear tax rate cut to avoid accumulating a surplus.1 3 1 This
suggestion, along with the actual refund, largely ignored taxes other than the
income tax.132 While not proposed, the constitution does not prevent refunds to
particular members of the public: Colorado could have "refunded" the money by
distributing it to particular citizens. 133 However, political pressures forced them
toward something approximating an income tax refund.
Missouri's "Hancock Amendment" does have a constitutionally compelled
method of refund return. Surpluses must be returned pro rata, based on the
taxpayer's state income tax liability. Despite this, the state avoided the restriction
on refunds.134 The governor attempted to get voter approval to spend the money on
transportation infrastructure but failed. Instead, the legislature avoided
130Michelle Johnston, Surplus Solutions Offered, DENVER POST, July 25, 1997, at B3.
Several other plans were advanced, some serious, some frivolous. One legislator proposed
giving the refund only to voters. John Sanko, Legislator Suggests Tax Refund Only Go to
Voters, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 7, 1997, at 4A. A flat refund to all citizens was
proposed by the drafter of the revenue limitation amendment, but was quickly rejected. John
Sanko, Bruce Calls Special Session a Waste, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 24, 1997, at
43A. He also noted an ironic wrinkle. The refund adopted by the legislature is probably
taxable by the federal government since it is tied to adjusted gross income, and therefore
looks like a return of state and local income taxes which were deductible. A flat refund
would look more like a refund of sales taxes, which would not be subject to federal tax. Id.
131 Johnston, supra note 126, at Al. Ironically, the limitations of the amendment may have
scared off the tax cut solution. There was substantial concern that bringing taxes back up
would require voter approval, even if the tax cut was explicitly temporary. Editorial, It's
Time For a Tax Cut, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 15, 1997, at 39A.
132This problem was noted, but was never adequately resolved. Genevieve Anton, Refund
Option Trimmed, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE, Oct. 21, 1997, at Al.
133Any direct transfer program could be replaced by tax refunds.
'
34Missouri has been running surpluses for three years to a total of $700 million. None of
this money has been returned yet. Scott Charton, Swollen Coffers are Headache for State
Officials, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 19, 1997, at 6C. A state Supreme Court equal
protection challenge attacking the constitutionality of a refund system based on income tax
liability has prevented the distribution of the refunds from the previous two years. The
Court found this refund plan constitutional in December. Missourians for Tax Justice
Education Project v. Holden, 959 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1997). This money is now being
returned in proportion to income tax liability. Bill Bell, Jr., Court Clears the Way for $695
Million in Missouri Tax Refunds, Dec. 24, 1997, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, at A7.
However, it is not clear that the legislature would have allowed this default provision to kick
in had the suit not occurred. Certainly, the 1997 experience indicates that they might have
tried to subvert the mandate.
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accumulating a surplus in two ways. First, the state cut the sales tax on food by 3%,
returning $250 million.135 This method was selected over a wide variety of other tax
proposals, in part because the tax on food was viewed as regressive. 136 A second,
$100 million, tax cut has been proposed. It provides a refundable income tax credit
for some portion of local property tax payments. 137 Missouri's system is formally
more constrained than Colorado, because it either leads to tax cuts or actual refunds,
but it is not clear that the framers of the Missouri revenue cap would have
approved. The constitutional mandate demonstrates a clear preference for income
tax cuts over sales tax cuts. The property tax cut is essentially a transfer from state
taxpayers to property owners. These refunds may not be wrong normatively, but
they certainly indicate that the legislature did not feel constrained by the
constitutional requirement.
Whether or not they are written into the state constitution, revenue limits
vary in another respect. Hawaii, California and Washington do not restrict revenues
directly. Instead, they restrict state expenditures and provide methods for
distributing excess funds in the state general fund. These effectively provide a
revenue limit by eliminating the state's discretion in how much they spend and how
they handle unspent revenues. These in theory can have the same general form as
pure revenue caps but, in practice, have one significant difference. These three
states are much slower to mandate refunds. The states with pure revenue limits tend
to mandate that any surplus must be immediately returned to the taxpayers. 138
California divides the surplus: 50% of the money is placed in a stabilization fund
and 50% is returned as refunds. Hawaii provides an even higher barrier for
refunds. The year end surplus must exceed 5% of state revenues before a refund is
required. 39 Despite this, Hawaii regularly provides refunds. In 1990, Hawaii
provided each taxpayer a $60 refund per personal exemption. In each year from
1991-95, the state gave a refund of $1 per personal exemption.' 4° Similarly,
Washington does not mandate that surplus revenues be returned, but instead targets
them toward education construction. Despite this, the money has not been spent
that way. The provision has not restrained the legislative stampede toward tax
'
35Jerry Heaster, Credit for Tax Cut is Hancock's, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 11, 1997 at B 1.
136Editorial, Down the Home Stretch, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, May 11, 1997, at B2.
137Will Sentell, Missouri Considers Property Tax Cut, KANSAS CITY STAR, Dec. 2, 1997 at
Al.
138Florida is the exception, feeding its surplus to the budget stabilization fund until it reaches
its limit, and then providing distribution of tax refunds.
1'9Even then, it is not clear how much of the surplus must be returned. They probably only
have to return enough to reduce the surplus down to the 5% level.
141990-1995 HAWAII SESSION LAWS. This gives Hawaii the distinction of being the only
state to provide a flat refund.
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cuts.' The experience in these states 142 indicate that limiting the refund
mechanism is not a successful way to constrain legislative discretion over how a
refund will be distributed. The cap does, however, remove additional spending
from the list of options.
One reason for this may be a lack of judicial enforcement. Missouri and
Colorado seem to foresee court activity as one means of enforcing the provision,
since they provide for the possibility of obtaining attorney's fees by successful
plaintiffs. Even with this provision, the only Colorado case is Havens v. Board. of
County Commissioners.1 43  The plaintiff challenged a local government's
referendum which allowed the county to retain and spend the revenues. The issue
was whether the county was required to reduce future revenues to offset these
retained funds. The court rejected this interpretation, reading the county's
obligation as either refunding the money or gaining voter approval to keep it. While
this case does show some interest in judicial enforcement, it does not indicate
whether the court is willing to calculate state revenues and evaluate whether the
legislature is violating the limit or whether the court might mandate a particular
refund mechanism.
The Missouri court refused an opportunity to make that determination. In
Dirck v. State,' several taxpayers sued, alleging they were owed refunds because
the state violated the revenue limit. The majority opinion rejecting the claim on
ripeness grounds is only two sentences long and provides little guidance. The
dissent also does not make clear why the majority found the issue not "ripe for
adjudication." However, the Missouri court has been willing to interpret various
sections of the amendment and tell the state whether or not certain items should be
included in "total state revenues." 145 Dirck may indicate that the court is willing to
decide what should be counted but not whether the state was over the limit.
141 Keri Murakami, Use Budget Surplus for Schools, Says Commission, Seattle Times, Jan.
8, 1995, at B I.
142 Michigan does not seem to be facing the surplus issue this year. The Michigan provision
is identical to Missouri's: a surplus must be returned proportionate to income liability.
Michigan did have a surplus in 1995 which they returned in two ways. $113 million was
returned through this type of pro rata refund. Another $91 million came back to the
taxpayers through a permanent increase in the personal exemption. Peter Luke, Michigan
Taxpayers are in Line for a Rebate Next Year, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 5, 1995 at Al.
141924 P.2d 517 (Colo. 1996).
'44665 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. 1984) (per curiam).
145 Buechner v. Bond, 650 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. 1983).
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Michigan's case law has also focused on what should be counted; the major
issue that has arisen is the definition of what constitutes a transfer of obligations to
a local government which leads to a lowering of the revenue ceiling. 146 Michigan
has had one case that indicates the courts may enforce the revenue ceilings directly.
Grosse lie Comm. for Legal Taxation v. Township of Grosse l/e 147 involved a
challenge to a local government property tax structure. The plaintiffs claimed that
the local government had exceeded the allowable property tax rate provided in a
different section of the constitution.. The court held that jurisdiction was
appropriate, and that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, and remanded the case to the
Tax Tribunal for a determination of whether the county actually exceeded the limit.
This may signify a willingness on the part of the court to enforce the Headlee
Amendment directly if the issue arises.
The most effective restraint on legislators in the surplus realm is probably
political. While specific refund mandates do not seem to have an effect on what the
states actually adopt, no legislature has attempted any steps that are particularly
unusual.
B. Defining Taxes: What's In; What's Out
Before the legislature gets to decide how to spend the money it collected
in excess of the limit, it needs to know where the limit is. States have selected a
variety of mechanisms to determine what ceiling should cap revenue. First the
author analyzes the general decisions that have been made, then the author
considers the one specific question from Part II that survives in the revenue cap
context: how unfunded mandates are treated. Finally, the author examines the
consequences when states try to combine supermajority requirements with revenue
caps.
1. Counting revenues
Arizona and Colorado exempt far more types of "revenue" from its
calculations than Missouri and Michigan. Missouri and Michigan only exclude
funds received from the federal government and revenue increases due to a shift in
responsibility for programs. Colorado, however, excludes refunds, which
presumably were counted in a previous year, gifts, federal funds, collections from
another government, pension contributions and pension fund earnings, reserve
'See, e.g., Schmidt v. Department. Of Educ., 490 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 1992).
147342 N.W.2d 582 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
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transfers, damage awards, and receipts from property sales.1 48 Arizona includes a
similar, even more extensive, list of exceptions. 149 Arizona excludes income from
bonds sales from state revenues, presumably as an analogy to the exclusion of loans
from gross income under the federal tax code: The bonds come with an associated
debt. Colorado includes bond income, but provides a "deduction" in the year the
bond is repaid. 5 ° Arizona also excludes interest and dividend income from
investments.
Colorado's constitution excludes all money received from the federal
government and the Arizona Attorney General has interpreted its Constitution in the
same way.' 5' Finally, while Colorado excludes pension plan funds, it does not
exclude money paid into the unemployment fund. Arizona excludes unemployment
monies, but does not explicitly exclude pension plan funds. However, Arizona does
leave out of revenues all money "received by the State in the capacity of trustee,
custodian, or agent," which likely includes pension plan funds.
Drawing up a federal list of exceptions would be trying. The exceptions
fall into three general categories. First, they exclude revenues that come with an
obligation: income from the sales of bonds, unemployment insurance payments,
money collected for cities and counties, and income received as trustee. Second,
non-recurring income is left out: gifts and money from the sale of property
(excluding interest and dividend income also fits into this category, although not
cleanly). Third, money that has already been included in revenue: transfers from
other state agencies and refunds from previous years. Each of these categories
would be far more complicated at the federal level, but the first is easily the hardest
and largest. Determining which social policy programs would be viewed as coming
with a corresponding obligation would be difficult and politically charged.
2. Unfunded Mandates
The states that impose revenue caps, rather than supermajority
requirements, have attempted to restrict the ability of the state legislature to require
that localities provide particular services. The experience in these states provides
"'
48COLO. CONST. Art. 10 § 20(2)(e).
'
49ARIZ. CONST. Art. 9 § 17(2).
'
50COLO. CONST. Art. 10. § 20(7)(d).
51Ariz. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 178-283 (1978). All federal funds transferred to the state,
including the federal share of all matching programs, are excluded.
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lessons for a federal requirement.' 52 The requirements that are in place in various
states tend to limit the ability of the state to place additional burdens on local
governments, either by reducing the revenue ceiling by any amount shifted or by
simply forbidding the creation of unfunded mandates. The most effective
provisions seem to be the second type, giving substantial power to localities to
resist new burdens.
Most states with revenue caps exert some limitation on the power of the
state to pass unfunded mandates requiring localities to pick up what were formerly
state obligations.'53 Florida and California have the most straightforward
restrictions. Florida reduces the revenue ceiling by an amount equivalent to the
reduction in responsibility and increases it for any increased obligation.'
54
California follows a similar approach. While it does not have a revenue cap per se,
California combines an expenditure limit with a requirement that surpluses be
refunded. The expenditure ceiling is adjusted for any transfer of responsibility.' 55
While these structures would seem to be an invitation for litigation, particularly on
the question of how to evaluate the "cost" of a responsibility transfer, no cases have
112Of course, some states without revenue caps have also limited the power of the legislature
to devolve. While this experience can be instructive, the difference between states with and
without the requirements is substantial, since the legislature faces much less temptation to
devolve when political pressure serves as the only restraint on their ability to fund new
services themselves.
153Three states with revenue caps do not limit the legislature's power to create unfunded
mandates. Massachusetts alters its revenue cap, but does not do so based on responsibility
transfers. The ceiling is lowered by any delegation of taxing authority to localities. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 62F §4 (1998). This provision thus does not restrict unfunded mandates, but
is instead specifically targets the size of government. The effect is to cap total revenue
intake by all levels of government. As written, the provision has a ratchet effect. If the state
reduces the taxing authority of smaller govemmental units, its revenue cap does not
increase. This provision also has not appeared in the case law, also perhaps because there
is not a pool of plaintiffs available who have a financial interest in challenging potentially
unconstitutional state activities. Hawaii and Louisiana are the only states that do not attempt
to reflect shifts of responsibility in their revenue caps. Hawaii does not have a standard
revenue cap; the constitution limits the growth rate of expenditures to that of the state
economy and requires that budget surpluses be refunded. HAW. CONST. Art. 7 § 9. Unlike
California, which has a similar provision, the expenditure growth rate is not reduced by
shifts of responsibility for programs. Louisiana's statutory cap on revenues also does not
limit these transfers. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §5001 (1998). Of course, there has been no
litigation on the effect of these provisions.
154 FLA. CONST. Art. 7, § l(e).
15' CAL. CONST. Art. 13(B) § 3.
1999]
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
arisen in either state. While these might provide good models for a federal revenue
cap, the structure does not easily transfer to a supermajority requirement.
However, four states have even stronger restrictions on the ability of the
legislature to evade revenue cap requirements by creating unfunded mandates, and
these do provide a model for federal legislation. Missouri and Michigan, whose
constitutional provisions are identical, prohibit either the statutory creation of new
local obligations without funding or the reduction of the proportion of funding the
state provides for activities it requires of counties. 156 If either a constitutional
amendment or court order transfers obligations between state and local
governments, then the revenue caps are adjusted to reflect this change. 157
Washington's statutory revenue cap is similar to the constitutional versions in
Missouri and Michigan. If the cost of any state program or function is shifted from
the general fund to another funding source, expenditure and revenue limits are
adjusted.' 58 Additionally, any new programs imposed on localities must be fully
funded.'59
Like the provisions in California and Florida, the adjustment of the revenue
caps have not received much attention from the courts in these states. 160 However,
the prohibitions on unfunded mandates have been the subject of extensive and
ongoing litigation and expose the primary danger behind simply prohibiting
unfunded mandates. State governments can be held liable for large and highly
unpredictable amounts.' 6 1 Just last year, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed a
156 Mo. CONST. Art. 10, § 18(d); MICH. CONST. Art. 9 § 29.
'5' MiCH. CONST Art. 9 § 26; MO. CONST. Art. 10 § 16.
158 WASH. REV. CODE §43.135.035 (1998).
159Md"
'60'he difference in the amount of litigation over bans on unfunded mandates compared to
those provisions which simply alter revenue caps based on responsibility transfers may turn
on the availability of relief. In states that simply adjust their revenue ceilings, no plaintiff
has a clear interest in suing. The individuals most likely to file suit are members of the
legislature who opposed the responsibility shift. While they have a political interest, they
do not have a financial motivation to sue. Counties are unlikely to appear as plaintiffs, and
may not even have standing, since they will not get an injunction against the shifted
obligation. In states where unfunded mandates are flatly prohibited, though, localities can
get the requirement lifted and may receive back funding for the time the obligation was in
place. See, e.g., Durant v. State, 566 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. 1997)
161The Missouri, Michigan and Washington Supreme Courts have attempted to provide some
limitation on legislative liability. The Michigan Court has rejected the most expansive
reading of the constitution, holding that the state need not continue to provide funding if the
program is optional. Livingston County v. Department of Management and Budget, 425
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summary judgment order in favor of the state in a case claiming that the state was
under-funding county foster children programs, 162 and imposed multi-billion dollar
liability on the state for failing to fund special education programs. 163 Like
Michigan, the Missouri Supreme Court has been willing to enforce this provision
vigorously. In 1992, the legislature attempted to expand special education
programs to three and four year olds and to impose part of the costs of the new
program on localities. The Missouri Court enjoined the expansion and rejected the
state's argument that unrestricted education funds provided by the state should
count as a form of "offset" to the unfunded mandate. The Missouri Legislature is
now required to provide a specific itemized appropriation for every new mandate
placed on a local government.64
Washington's cases have arisen primarily in the criminal arena. In State v.
Howard, 165 the court imposed the costs of indigent criminal defense upon the state
when the Attorney General, rather than a local prosecutor, initiates the prosecution.
The Washington Court, in holding the state responsible for an expansion of a
domestic violence prevention program, has also refused to limit the requirement to
shifts involving programs "traditionally managed" by the state.' 66 This approach is
certainly the most consistent with the language of the constitution, yet it means that
a wide variety of activities are technically unfunded mandates. For instance, every
time the legislature passes a statute expanding criminal penalties, it is responsible
for additional funding.
The presence of substantial litigation on these issues might indicate that
these provisions are substantially constraining state behavior. However, it is
N.W.2d 65, 72 (Mich. 1988). Missouri has adopted the same view of its constitution, and
provides a de minims exception.. County of Jefferson v. Quiktrip Corp., 917 S.W.2d 487,
491 (Mo. 1995) (en banc). City of Seattle v. State, 666 P.2d 359 (Wash. 1983), the first
Washington case examining the unfunded mandates provision, limited the restriction to
mandates imposed by the state legislature, holding that the legislature need not fund a
program established by a new court rule. Furthermore, at least in Missouri and Michigan,
monetary relief is supposed to only be an extraordinary remedy, even though it has been
awarded. See e.g., Durant, 566 N.W.2d at 272; Rolla 31 School District v. State, 837
S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. 1992)(stating that "[t]he legislature does not insure the constitutionality
of its actions"). Washington has not been reticent about awarding costs, and seemed to
assume that a monetary award was a matter of course.
162 Oakland County v. State, 566 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. 1997).
163 Durant, 566 N.W.2d at 272.
164 Rolla 31 School District v. State, 837 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. 1992).
165722 P.2d 783 (Wash. 1985).
166City of Tacoma v. State, 816 P.2d 7 (Wash. 1991).
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noteworthy that all of the cases involve expansions of state programs to provide a
wider range of services. These were not situations where a state is attempting to
evade a pre-existing obligation that became too expensive to administer. Of course,
the requirements may mean that state legislatures do not even attempt to shift
programs in toto, since that would clearly violate the mandate. Whether states
would take such a step even absent these constitutional requirements is an open
question, because localities do have some political power to fight such changes.
Rather than limit the power of the state to pass unfunded or underfunded
mandates, Colorado empowered the localities. Except for public education and
federal mandates, districts have constitutional authorization to stop supporting
programs even if the general assembly delegated the program to them. 167 While
shifting responsibility for a program may place a local government in a difficult
ethical and political situation, they are legally able to decline to take the obligation.
Under two recent Colorado cases,1 61 though, the continued viability of this provision
is in question. Both cases turn on the use of the word "subsidy," a term not given
a definition in the constitution. Mesa prevented counties from refusing to provide
funding for courthouse security and Weld held that a county cannot stop paying its
required 20% share of welfare support. 69 The cases point out that the state creates
counties and thus exist only as subdivisions. Therefore payments made from the
county on the order of the state cannot be subsidies, since a government cannot
subsidize itself. While clever, this logic eviscerates the provision, since all cities
and counties are state creations. There has not been further litigation on attempts
to reduce local government subsidies. This type of voluntary "opt-out" provision
has the advantage of providing a choice to localities whether to accept or reject the
program. If localities feel that a program is unfunded, the simple threat to stop
paying may force the legislature to act without litigation. Whereas in states without
such a provision, litigation is almost inevitable. Either the locality will sue for
funding or the state will sue when the locality stops paying.
Unfortunately, the empirical data available is not adequate to determine
whether these various provisions are limiting the creation of unfunded mandates.
The data on local government revenues I have been able to find is, at best,
sporadic. Even if consistent aggregate data were available, it might not answer the
question adequately. Most of the changes are likely to be small compared to the
overall level of spending. States may be increasing counties' shares of programs
117 COLO. CONST. Art. 10 § 20(9).
"' State ex rel. Norton v. Board. Of County Comm'rs, 897 P.2d 788 (1995); Romer v. Bord
of County Comm'rs, 897 P.2d 779 (1995).
'
69Mesa, 897 P.2d at 791; Weld, 897 P.2d at 782.
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by five or ten per cent, which would not necessarily show in the overall data. At
a minimum, though, the lesson from the states on restrictions on unfunded mandates
is that, while important, these restrictions present substantial dangers.
3. Combining Revenue Caps and Supermajority Requirements
Adding a supermajority requirement on top of a revenue cap constrains the
state's discretion in two significant ways. First, revenue limits implicitly accept
shifting among different tax types as long as the cap is not exceeded, while the
supermajority requirement prevents it. However, it is not evident that the voters
enacting these provisions recognize this. Missouri adopted its supermajority
requirement for tax increases in 1996 on top of its 1980 Hancock Amendment
imposing a revenue limitation. One primary argument in favor of the 1996
provision was that a large increase in income taxes in 1993 had, in part, caused a
current surplus leading to a sales tax cut. However, the tenor of the campaign was
much more "anti-tax" than "anti-tax shifting." 170 Similarly, Florida adopted its
supermajority mandate in 1996, two years after adopting a revenue limit. The
revenue limit was presented as a reason the supermajority requirement was
unnecessary. Here too, though, the focus of the campaign was on restricting taxes
rather than locking in the current distribution across tax types.
171
Second, supermajority requirements limit the state's options when surpluses
occur. The combination could have one of two effects on tax cuts. States with both
provisions may have stronger anti-tax sentiment. This may lead legislators to take
any opportunity to cut taxes which is presented to them. Or their fear of the
difficulty of raising taxes might discourage cuts, leading legislators to prefer
refunds. At least in some states, the combination has acted as an obstruction to tax
cuts when a surplus exists. Colorado's government knew in advance that receipts
were running ahead of spending and in fact accumulated a significant surplus this
year. A primary reason that an income refund was preferred over preemptive tax
cuts was the possibility that voter approval would be necessary to bring taxes back
up. 7 2 However, most states have not been deterred from tax cuts based on the
difficulty of raising them again. Missouri has adopted tax cuts, as have both
California and Washington. There has not seemed to be a preference in those states
toward tax refunds over tax cuts. Both options are on the table and are not
170jo Mannies, Amendment 4 Ads Carry a Lot of Baggage, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar.
27, 1996, at B5.
171 Diane Hirth, State Tax-Cap Amendment Has Dole's Support, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 1996, at A17.
112Editorial, supra note 131, at 39A.
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discussed with reference to the supermajority requirement. Florida and Louisiana
have not yet had the opportunity to distribute surpluses under their provisions.
V. CONCLUSION: ENTRENCHMENT
Since a supermajority Rule has been enacted and more stringent
supermajority legislation has been seriously discussed, while a federal revenue cap
has only been mentioned in passing, the most likely outcome at the federal level is
a supermajority requirement designed to reduce the size of government. The
experiences of the states is complicated but instructive for designing federal
restrictions on revenues. First, it seems to matter little whether the limitation is
imposed by statute or by amendment. Second, Congress needs to draw a clear line
between taxes and fees in the supermajority context, since the existing federal
precedent on the issue is not helpful. If Congress' goal is to keep the size of
government down, taxes should be defined broadly and fees narrowly. Third,
Congress needs to be aware of the danger of locking itself into a particular tax
distribution. A supermajority not only limits the size of government, it limits
Congress' ability to rearrange the burden of government among different taxpayers.
Finally, the states' experiences with evading these revenue caps should give
Congress pause about trying to limit the size of government through a
supermajority requirement. Before taking any steps, Congress needs to decide why
it is imposing a limitation. If the aim is to entrench a particular set of policies, a
revenue cap would be ineffective and a supermajority requirement is the only
option. If the goal is to keep the size of the federal government down, as most of
the debate seems to indicate, a revenue cap is probably better suited to that
objective, despite the definitional problems that arise in the refund context.
Congress' flexibility on the spending side of fiscal policy has been
substantially limited over the last three decades. Formal caps on discretionary
spending have been imposed repeatedly since the 1990 budget act, and the
percentage of the federal budget available for discretionary spending has also
plummeted through two informal entrenching measures. First, the tradition of
deficit spending has increased the proportion of the budget dedicated to interest
payments on the national debt. Past spending decisions became entrenched in the
most direct way possible. Past legislatures spent money they did not have to further
those interests. Second, the percentage of federal funds dedicated to entitlement
spending has consistently gone up. Perhaps unintentionally, the promises made
through Social Security and Medicare have combined with demographic changes
to politically entrench a particular set of (primarily pro elderly) policy views into
the fiscal environment.
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Supermajority requirements and revenue caps are the first attempt to
formally entrench policy preferences and limit legislative discretion on the revenue
side of the fiscal equation. Informal requirements, especially perceived political
costs, have restrained tax behavior for a long time, but formal mechanisms being
implemented in the states and proposed for the federal government are very
different. While designed to achieve a specific set of policy goals, they often
constrain legislative behavior in a variety of unintended ways. The lessons from
the states provide guidance about how to attempt to shape revenue limitations that
do only what they are supposed to do, whether it is limit the size of the government
or solidify a particular set of policy compromises.

